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Theories of political redistribution are tested using data collected in three phases of the International
Social Survey Programme. Individuals categorized as having high, middle, or low incomes were asked
whether they consider the overall tax burden in their countries too high, too low or about right. Very
few citizens indicated that they were satisfied with tax systems; most believed that taxes on low and
middle incomes are too high, while taxes on high incomes are too low. Support for tax systems is
bimodal within the income classes, with the richest 5% being the most supportive, and the median in a
population being second. Ideological values have a strong impact on political support for redistribution
across all income classes. The results bear witness to the multidimensional nature of preferences for
redistribution, and to the delicate question of the effectiveness of democracy in implementing citizens’
preferences.
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1. Introduction
The literature on political redistribution interplays with different fields of the social sciences
(see the surveys of Hettich and Winer, 1997; Boadway and Keen, 2000). A central idea in the
literature is the median voter theorem, or the hypothesis that redistributive taxation in0176-2680/$ - see front matter D 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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through majority voting or indirectly through competition among political parties (Downs
1957).
The median-voter theorem has, however, been criticized from various perspectives. A
particular criticism is that the median voter approach is naı¨ve in accepting the principle of one
person-one vote, since the rich have more political power and access than the poor (see e.g.,
Schwabish et al., 2003, and the literature quoted therein). A further criticism (especially
emphasized by the political science tradition, e.g., Hicks and Swank, 1992) points out that the
median voter approach ignores the many social and ideological dimensions that, in addition to
the economic, may affect preferences for redistribution and may prevent the poor speaking with
a single voice. More technical aspects may also be important. It is in particular well known that
that only when the political space is one-dimensional and individual preferences are single-
peaked (or more generally satisfy the single-crossing condition of Gans and Smart, 1996), does
majority voting always result in a stable median voter equilibrium.
The median-voter theorem has also been criticized for predicting more redistribution than that
is observed.1 Various proposals have been put forward to explain limits to real-world
redistribution (see Harms and Zink, 2003, for a thorough review). In particular, it may be in
the interest of the poor majority to limit political redistribution: because of incentive effects of
distortionary taxation, a drationalT median voter may refrain from seeking to impose too high
taxation on the rich because that would reduce the overall income to be redistributed (Meltzer
and Richard, 1981). Another line of reasoning highlights incentives associated with social
mobility (originally proposed by Hirschman, 1973, with contributions by Piketty, 1995;
Be´nabou and Ok, 2001).
The empirical methods that have been used in seeking evidence on the theories include using
answers from social surveys to investigate directly beliefs about redistribution policies. The
studies (which include Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000; Fong, 2001; Corneo and Gru¨ner, 2002;
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005) indicate that many factors influence attitudes on redistribution. A
problem with the studies so far conducted, however, is that they focus on questions about general
preferences for redistribution2 but are silent on whether or not people are in fact satisfied with
real-world redistributive policies. Therefore, the relevance to testing theories of redistributive
political outcomes like the median voter theorem is rather indirect.3
In order to study the theories more directly, in this paper we conduct an empirical analysis
using data from 22 democratic countries, from three modules of the International Social Survey
Programme (ISSP). Our focus is three questions asking individuals whether they consider the1 This is often exemplified with reference to a very simple model, represented by a linear-tax-cum-transfer schedule,
where each individual pays taxes proportional to income treated as exogenously given and receives back a lump sum
transfer equal for all citizens. With such a simple scheme, the model implies that the majority would vote for a tax rate of
unity, hence for complete redistribution, whenever the pre-tax median income is below the average (which is the standard
case for most, if not all, real world income distributions).
2 For example, Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) look to the answers to a survey question asking: dDo you agree or
disagree that the government must restrict the income of the rich?T And they note: bA natural interpretation of the drestrict
the rich?T question is that some form of tax is contemplated, to be levied on incomes above some level. That level, and
what to be done with the revenue, are both left to the imagination of the respondentQ (p. 90).
3 See Perotti (1996), Bassett et al. (1999) and Milanovic (2000) for approaches that use cross-countries variations of
macro determinants (e.g., inequality, growth, unemployment) to study models of political redistribution. These
approaches are generally not friendly to the median voter hypothesis, but have problems in distinguishing between
alternative models because variations in the effects of macro determinants are transversal across different theories.
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with high, middle, and low incomes.
The descriptive analysis of the answers shows that there are very few respondents satisfied
with the redistributive tax systems in their countries: on average, only about 5.9% of the sample
consider taxes on all three income levels as dabout rightT; on the contrary, large, in most cases
absolute, majorities believe that taxes for low and middle incomes are dtoo highT, and that taxes
for high incomes are dtoo lowT. We compare the answers to the tax questions with the responses
that the same individuals gave to a question previously used by Corneo and Gru¨ner (2002) to
analyse people’s preferences for redistribution from a general perspective. For all countries
included in the sample, we find that people who have high preferences for redistribution tend to
be less satisfied with existing tax systems; and people with low preferences for redistribution are
among the most satisfied.
An empirical strategy built on logistic analysis is applied to test several ideas in the literature
on political redistribution. Predictions from the median voter theorem are compared with
expectations obtained from several of the various alternative approaches. The study delivers a
complex, but we believe interesting picture. We see that most of the influences that the
theoretical literature has argued should affect people’s preferences for redistribution—including
income, ideology, personal characteristics, values and beliefs—do in fact influence attitudes
towards real-world tax redistributive systems. No factor, however, seems by itself to have a
pivotal effect in generating political support for the current tax systems.
In particular, the effect of income class is surprising. Satisfaction with current tax systems is
bimodal within the income classes, with a clear indication that people in the top income classes,
represented in the analysis by the richest 5%, are the most supportive of the current tax systems.
Quite interestingly, we find that the second most supportive are people with median incomes,
while people with an income between the median and the mean or even above the mean (but
lower than the threshold for the 95th percentile), are less supportive. We quantify the potential
effect of the different income classes being decisive for the current tax systems but find that the
impacts are modest. In fact, when controlling for all the other factors that may influence
preferences for redistribution, we see that, even among the most supportive 5% richest, the
percentage of those thinking that taxes are dabout rightT on all income levels is, on average, about
8.8%. It is 7.2% among the median population, 5.3% among people with an income below the
median, just above 6% both among the individuals with an income between the median and the
mean, and among those with an income between the mean and the threshold for the 95th
percentile.
Among other factors that the literature has argued are important for redistributive political
outcomes is ideological confrontation. We see that rightists are generally more supportive of the
current tax systems than both left and centre. Even in this case, however, the favour does not
appear decisive, as the main difference across partisan positions is between those (leftists) who
prefer lower taxes for the poor and higher taxes for the rich, and those (rightists) desiring lower
taxes for all (with centrists somewhere in between).
We also control for respondents’ comprehension of the countries’ tax systems, as recent
research has proposed that people’s perceptions of taxes and economic policy can be mistaken
and misconceived (e.g., Bartels, 2004; Blinder and Krueger, 2004; Slemrod, 2003). No support
is found for such a conjecture. People’s disappointment about too little redistribution is lower in
countries where the tax systems are more progressive, and stronger where they are less so.
Considered as a whole, the results bear witness to the complexity of the different themes
involved in redistributive policies, and to the difficult question of the effectiveness of democracy
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the various themes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reports the data from the ISSP on people’s
satisfaction with the current tax systems and compare them with people’s general preferences for
redistribution. Section 3 outlines the empirical strategy used to analyse the previously presented
data. Section 4 gives the results for the whole sample of countries. Additional material, including
a test conducted on homogeneous groups of countries to check the solidity of the evidence
reported for the full sample, is consigned to the Appendix.
2. Opinions on redistributive tax systems and preferences for redistribution in 22
democracies
This section reports data on the opinions expressed by people in several democracies on the
redistributive tax systems of their countries, and then compares the opinions with the preferences
for political redistribution expressed more generally by the same people.
2.1. Public opinion on redistributive tax systems
The data is from surveys conducted between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s by the International
Social Survey Programme (ISSP). This programme provides one of the sources of individual data from
representative samples of the population of several countries most widely used in empirical research in
many fields of social science.4 Data from this programme has for example been used by Corneo
and Gru¨ner (2002) in their study of preferences for redistribution. The data considered in this
paper is from three modules: the Social Inequality Modules I and II, conducted respectively in
1987 and 1992, and the Role of Government Module III in 1996. Several countries participated
in the three modules. Overall, we could select data from 35 surveys referring to 22 countries, as
some countries participated in more than one ISSP module. We have, in particular, data from the
following countries (in brackets the year of the survey): Australia (1987, 1992), Austria (1987,
1992), Bulgaria (1996), Canada (1996), Czech Republic (1992, 1996), France (1996), East
Germany (1992, 1996), West Germany5 (1987, 1992, 1997), Great Britain (1987, 1992, 1996),
Hungary (1996), Ireland (1996), Italy (1996), Japan (1996), Netherlands (1987), New Zealand
(1996), Norway (1992, 1996), Poland (1996), Russia (1996), Slovenia (1992, 1996), Sweden
(1996), Switzerland (1987, 1996), United States (1987, 1992, 1996).
Three questions were repeated identically in each of the three ISSP module-surveys. The first
question is: bGenerally, how would you describe taxes in respondent’s country today? We mean
all taxes together, including national insurance (social security in Australia and USA), income
tax, VAT (sales tax in Australia and USA), and all the restQ. Then, three individual questions
specify: a) bFirst, for those with high incomes, are taxes. . .Q; b) bNext, for those with middle
incomes, are taxes. . .Q; c) bLastly, for those with low incomes, are taxes . . .Q. Respondents can
complete each question choosing among: bmuch too highQ, btoo highQ, babout rightQ, btoo lowQ,
bmuch too lowQ.4 A comprehensive list (compiled and routinely updated by Tim W. Smith) of the research conducted using the ISSP
data set is at http://www.issp.org/biblio.htm.
5 Following the ISSP classification system, in this paper we keep East and West Germany distinct even after unification
in 1992.
Table 1
Distributions of answers to the tax questions on low, middle, and high incomes
Country (survey) Taxes on low incomes Taxes on middle incomes Taxes on high incomes
dToo
lowT
dAbout
rightT
dToo
highT
dToo
lowT
dAbout
rightT
dToo
highT
dToo
lowT
dAbout
rightT
dToo
high
Australia (1987, ’92) 1.6 27.0 71.4 3.3 38.1 58.6 38.9 29.4 31.8
West Germany (1987, ’92, ’96) 0.6 14.6 84.8 3.1 45.5 51.4 58.5 28.6 12.9
East Germany (1992, ’96) 0.2 9.9 90.0 7.7 54.3 38.1 77.6 15.9 6.5
Great Britain (1987, ’92, ’96) 0.9 17.6 81.4 6.6 56.1 37.3 44.0 35.4 20.6
United States (1987,’92, ’96) 3.4 26.8 69.8 2.2 26.4 71.4 54.4 21.2 24.4
Austria (1987, ’92) 2.5 19.5 78.1 2.8 49.6 47.6 54.2 29.2 16.7
Hungary (1996) 7.8 8.9 83.3 9.4 29.3 61.4 56.2 23.6 20.2
Italy (1996) 0.9 5.8 93.2 2.4 20.4 77.2 50.8 20.4 28.9
Ireland (1996) 0.8 11.9 87.3 2.0 15.7 82.4 22.8 23.3 54.0
Netherlands (1987) 1.1 19.3 79.7 2.1 38.0 59.9 48.2 25.3 26.5
Norway (1992, ’96) 0.8 19.8 79.5 1.9 45.3 52.9 46.3 28.1 25.6
Sweden (1996) 0.9 16.8 82.3 3.2 54.4 42.4 62.4 19.4 18.2
Czech Republic (1992, ’96) 2.0 19.0 79.1 5.1 48.4 46.5 49.3 30.8 19.9
Slovenia (1992, ’96) 0.9 9.1 90.1 7.5 53.2 39.3 56.9 30.0 13.1
Poland (1996) 0.7 6.6 92.8 3.3 32.3 64.4 32.5 25.3 42.2
Bulgaria (1996) 0.1 15.6 84.3 4.1 44.6 51.3 68.3 20.7 11.0
Russia (1996) 1.8 15.6 82.6 3.6 38.6 57.8 40.5 32.3 27.3
New Zealand (1996) 1.2 34.9 63.9 2.5 46.1 51.4 38.2 34.2 27.5
Canada (1996) 2.5 30.9 66.6 1.3 24.6 74.1 44.9 22.9 32.3
Japan (1996) 4.7 18.9 76.4 4.3 39.1 56.7 50.3 25.5 24.2
France (1996) 7.4 22.6 69.9 1.7 20.1 78.1 46.2 22.1 31.8
Switzerland (1987, ’96) 0.9 31.1 68.0 1.3 51.1 47.6 68.1 23.1 8.8
Total 1.8 19.2 79.0 3.6 41.7 54.7 51.9 26.4 21.6
6 Henceforth, we use plain text between dapostrophesT for variables and definitions based on our re-classification; we
use italics between bquotation marksQ for the original ISSP categories.
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re-classified the original 5 ISSP types of answer into three categories: dtoo highT, merging the
two answers bmuch too highQ and btoo highQ6; dabout rightT replicating responses babout rightQ;
and dtoo lowT merging the ISSP categories bmuch too lowQ and btoo lowQ. (The frequencies for
the five original ISSP answers are reported in Bernasconi, 2004).
There are differences across countries, though a similar general picture holds in most cases.
Indeed, the majority of people in the different countries describe taxes on both low and middle
incomes as dtoo highT, while taxes on high incomes are viewed by most as dtoo lowT. The
frequencies of dtoo highT answers in the question for low incomes are very large in all countries:
the average is 79%, with the minimum and the maximum being, respectively, 63.9% in New
Zealand and 93.2% in Italy. In the question for middle incomes, there are 15 out of 22 countries
where the percentage of dtoo highT answers is greater than 50%; the mean is 54.7%. The
frequency of dtoo lowT answers is very low in almost all surveys (slightly greater frequencies in
Hungary, East Germany, Slovenia, possibly Great Britain); the percentage saying that taxes are
dabout rightT ranges from a low of 15.7% (Ireland) to a high of 56.1% (Great Britain), with
41.7% being the average of the entire sample. In the question for taxes on high incomes, in 20
out of 22 countries relative majorities answer that taxes are dtoo lowT; in 11 cases the percentage
Table 2
Distributions of ordered triplets
Country (survey) LLLLLRLRLLRRLLHLHLLRHLHRLHHRLLRLRRRLRRRRLHRHLRRHRHRRHHHLLHLRHRLHRRHLHHHLHRHHHRHHH
Australia (1987, ’92) 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.0 4.9 6.8 0.0 2.7 1.7 3.5 7.0 2.5 0.1 16.1 6.9 0.1 11.8 1.5 11.9 20.4
West Germany (1987, ’92, ’96) 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 3.4 5.6 0.0 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.7 2.8 0.1 28.6 6.8 0.0 22.2 0.8 14.6 8.6
East Germany (1992, ’96) 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 3.5 2.1 0.0 1.0 0.8 0.6 1.4 7.4 0.1 44.8 3.7 0.0 20.7 0.4 9.3 3.8
Great Britain (1987, ’92, ’96) 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.9 0.0 3.5 8.4 0.0 0.4 1.3 1.2 2.0 5.2 0.2 25.6 14.6 0.2 8.3 2.4 10.7 14.1
United States (1987,’92, ’96) 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.9 0.3 0.0 4.5 5.8 0.0 8.4 1.1 3.4 3.6 1.3 0.1 9.6 3.6 0.1 29.7 1.1 7.7 16.5
Austria (1987, ’92) 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.0 3.9 6.5 0.1 2.1 2.0 1.9 3.2 1.9 0.1 28.2 6.9 0.0 17.7 1.5 13.8 7.7
Hungary (1996) 0.7 1.7 0.7 0.2 1.6 0.2 2.3 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2 1.5 2.2 0.2 1.3 1.0 0.5 1.5 4.5 0.0 18.2 2.5 0.2 28.8 0.8 16.2 12.2
Italy (1996) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.3 0.1 0.9 0.7 0.7 1.3 2.1 0.0 14.0 3.2 0.1 32.5 0.9 14.9 25.6
Ireland (1996) 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.4 2.4 0.1 0.8 0.8 1.3 5.3 1.1 0.2 7.2 2.8 0.0 12.6 1.8 16.4 45.5
Netherlands (1987) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.0 2.7 4.8 0.1 1.4 2.1 2.9 5.6 1.8 0.1 22.3 5.0 0.1 19.7 1.5 12.6 16.2
Norway (1992, ’96) 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 5.6 7.7 0.0 1.1 1.7 1.2 2.2 1.2 0.0 21.3 7.3 0.1 16.7 1.5 11.6 19.9
Sweden (1996) 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.0 7.4 4.6 0.0 0.7 1.5 0.4 2.1 2.9 0.0 34.6 5.4 0.0 16.3 0.6 8.7 13.5
Czech Republic (1992, ’96) 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.2 4.0 6.5 0.0 1.3 1.7 1.5 3.2 3.7 0.1 26.0 8.3 0.1 13.3 1.8 13.5 12.2
Slovenia (1992, ’96) 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.1 2.6 4.6 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.1 6.0 0.3 32.1 11.0 0.4 14.6 2.3 13.6 9.4
Poland (1996) 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.9 3.6 0.0 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.6 2.0 0.4 15.0 8.6 0.7 13.9 3.2 12.7 36.3
Bulgaria (1996) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.1 0.0 7.3 5.6 0.0 0.9 1.2 0.0 0.3 3.3 0.0 26.2 4.3 0.1 29.0 1.3 11.3 7.9
Russia (1996) 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.2 3.2 7.6 0.0 0.7 1.2 0.7 1.0 1.8 0.1 15.8 7.5 0.1 16.9 1.7 15.9 22.9
New Zealand (1996) 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.1 7.0 13.7 0.0 2.6 2.4 3.5 5.3 1.5 0.0 14.5 7.1 0.0 11.9 1.4 9.7 17.0
Canada (1996) 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.9 0.1 0.0 4.6 5.1 0.0 7.3 1.1 4.8 8.3 0.9 0.0 8.9 4.5 0.0 22.4 0.7 7.6 21.1
Japan (1996) 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.2 1.0 0.1 1.2 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.0 3.6 6.5 0.1 2.0 3.5 0.7 2.8 1.9 0.2 14.9 6.3 0.2 26.4 2.3 11.4 11.9
France (1996) 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 1.3 0.6 1.1 4.2 0.3 0.0 2.9 2.6 0.1 5.2 0.8 4.4 6.6 1.3 0.0 10.7 2.1 0.2 24.7 0.3 12.2 18.3
Switzerland (1987, ’96) 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 9.4 7.8 0.0 6.5 1.7 3.6 1.8 1.0 0.1 28.0 3.9 0.0 22.8 0.5 7.7 4.1
Total 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.0 4.3 5.9 0.0 2.5 1.4 1.9 3.0 2.7 0.1 22.3 6.4 0.1 19.3 1.3 11.8 14.7
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M. Bernasconi / European Journal of Political Economy 22 (2006) 809–837 815is greater than 50%; only in one country, namely Ireland, the opposite is true. On the entire
sample, answers of the type dabout rightT are 26.4%, with a maximum of 35.4% (in Great
Britain), and a minimum of 15.9% (in East Germany).
In order to appreciate other characteristics of the data, as well as to introduce a classifying
category that will be used later in the empirical analysis, we now consider jointly the answers
given by each individual to the three questions. In particular, let a typical pattern given by a
respondent to the three questions be denoted by an ordered triplet {*,*,*}, where each * can take
one of three possible values: H for dtoo highT, R for dabout rightT, L for dtoo lowT. Let the order of
the triplet be that the first * denotes the answer to the question about taxes on low incomes, then
on middle incomes, and on high incomes.
Thus, for example, the triple {H,R,L} denotes the answer of an individual saying that taxes
are dtoo highT for those with low incomes, are dabout rightT for those with middle incomes, and
are dtoo lowT for those with high incomes; the triple {R,R,R} therefore denotes an answer that
taxes on all income levels are dabout rightT. Given this notation, 27 patterns of answers to the
three questions are possible. Table 2 shows the triplet distribution across the country surveys.
There are interesting features to notice.
First of all, in essentially all surveys, there are few people saying that taxes are dabout rightT
on all three income levels, namely giving triplet RRR. In the total sample, the frequency is 5.9%.
There are countries where the frequencies are slightly higher, in particular New Zealand,
followed by Great Britain, Switzerland, and Norway; and countries where they are lower, suchTable 3
Preferences for redistribution as expressed in question on responsibility of the government to reduce income differences
Country (survey) bAgree
stronglyQ
bAgreeQ bNeither agree
nor disagreeQ
bDisagreeQ bDisagree
stronglyQ
Australia (1987, ’92) 9.5 33.7 20.9 28.3 7.6
West Germany (1987, ’92, ’96) 17.8 40.3 17.7 16.1 8.1
East Germany (1992, ’96) 39.7 42.8 8.8 7.4 1.4
Great Britain (1987, ’92, ’96) 23.1 38.3 15.6 18.8 4.3
United States (1987,’92, ’96) 9.5 23.7 22.8 29.2 14.8
Austria (1987, ’92) 31.9 43.1 10.6 11.5 3.0
Hungary (1996) 36.9 29.9 18.4 10.6 4.3
Italy (1996) 35.4 29.3 14.3 13.0 8.1
Ireland (1996) 25.9 39.6 14.6 16.1 3.8
Netherlands (1987) 16.3 48.8 11.2 18.1 5.6
Norway (1992, ’96) 19.0 39.5 17.4 17.9 6.2
Sweden (1996) 32.3 27.3 19.7 13.1 7.5
Czech Republic (1992, ’96) 26.0 37.7 14.3 17.0 5.0
Slovenia (1992, ’96) 41.4 38.4 9.2 8.5 2.5
Poland (1996) 41.4 36.7 11.6 7.4 2.9
Bulgaria (1996) 34.8 33.1 13.9 13.5 4.7
Russia (1996) 43.3 30.7 14.2 8.4 3.5
New Zealand (1996) 15.1 22.9 18.6 29.2 14.1
Canada (1996) 17.7 25.2 14.8 23.0 19.4
Japan (1996) 27.4 20.5 24.6 9.8 17.9
France (1996) 42.9 25.2 12.6 11.0 8.4
Switzerland (1987, ’96) 16.1 34.3 15.6 24.6 9.4
Total 24.1 34.8 16.1 17.6 7.4
Exact wording of the question: It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between
people with high incomes and those with low incomes.
M. Bernasconi / European Journal of Political Economy 22 (2006) 809–837816as Ireland, Hungary, East Germany and Italy, the latter with the lowest frequency of all (only
1.3%).
Another characteristic of the data is that the frequencies are polarized over a limited number
of triplets. In fact, in 18 out of 22 countries, the relative majorities of answers are for triplets
either HRL or HHL, which in some surveys account together for more than 50% of all triplets.
Both these patterns show that taxes are dtoo lowT on high incomes and dtoo highT on low
incomes; the second triplet shows the latter also for middle incomes. Both triplets can therefore
be seen as expressing disappointment for too little redistribution in the tax systems (possibly also
triplets RRL and HLL). On the other hand, notice that patterns signalling an opposite judgement,
that there is too much redistribution in the tax systems, as it may for example be indicated by
triplets LLH, LRH, LHH or even RRH, count much lower proportions (2.3% only for the
aggregate of the above four triplets). Other triplets frequent in most countries are triplets HHH
and HHR: the latter triplet shows that taxes are dtoo highT on the low and middle incomes; the
first that taxes are too high for all income levels.
At the level of individual countries there are clearly some differences: pattern HRL varies
between the lowest value of 7.2% in Ireland to the highest of 44.8% in East Germany; triplet
HHL between 8.3% in Great Britain and 32.5% in Italy; triple HHH, between 4.1% inTable 4
Cross-evidence between ordered triplets and preferences for redistribution
Distribution of ordered triplets across agreements that governments should reduce income differences
bAgree
stronglyQ
bAgreeQ bNeither agree
nor disagreeQ
bDisagreeQ bDisagree
stronglyQ
Total prop.
LLL 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1
LLR 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
LRL 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
LRR 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
LLH 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.1
LHL 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2
LRH 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.4
LHR 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.1
LHH 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.6 0.4
RLL 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.4
RLR 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
RRL 3.0 4.7 5.1 4.9 3.3 4.3
RRR 2.3 4.3 8.0 10.0 10.4 5.9
RLH 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
RHL 1.5 2.4 2.7 3.9 3.4 2.6
RRH 0.3 0.8 1.7 2.6 4.1 1.4
RHR 0.6 1.4 2.3 3.8 4.2 2.0
RHH 0.9 1.7 3.3 5.6 9.2 3.0
HLL 5.5 2.7 1.4 1.1 0.7 2.7
HLR 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1
HRL 29.7 27.2 18.5 12.5 7.9 22.3
HRR 4.7 6.8 7.7 7.5 4.0 6.4
HLH 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
HHL 26.9 20.3 15.9 13.3 11.6 19.3
HRH 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.2 1.7 1.3
HHR 9.7 12.3 14.2 12.1 9.6 11.8
HHH 11.2 12.1 15.0 19.1 25.9 14.6
100 100 100 100 100 100
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systems are negligible in all countries.
2.2. Cross evidence with preference for redistribution
It is interesting to compare the distribution of the answers to the tax questions with the
preferences people have more generally for political redistribution. Following Corneo and
Gru¨ner (2002), the latter can in particular be obtained in the ISSP surveys from the answers
given to a question centered on the following statement: bIt is the responsibility of the
government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and people
with low incomesQ. Respondents can choose among five possible responses: bagree stronglyQ,
bagreeQ, bneither agree nor disagreeQ, bdisagreeQ, bdisagree stronglyQ.
Table 3 shows the frequencies of the answers for the countries and surveys included in the
sample, while Table 4 gives, for the entire sample, the distributions of the ordered triplets
across the answers to preferences for redistribution. The evidence from the latter table is that
there are correlations between preferences for redistribution and the distribution of the ordered
triplets. In particular, considering patterns pointing to disappointment with the tax systems for
little redistribution, like the major two triplets HRL and HHL, the table shows that they are
more frequent among people with a stronger preference for redistribution, and less among
those with a weaker preference: for example, the frequency of people giving the above two
triplets decreases in both from between 26–29% among those who strongly agree that
governments should reduce income difference, to between 7–11% among those who strongly
disagree. The opposite tendency applies to the less frequent triplets showing disappointment for
too much redistribution in the tax systems (such as, for example, triplet LHH or also RRH),
and among those viewing taxes overall too high (in particular triplet HHH). Interestingly, a
similar trend also holds amongst those satisfied with the tax systems, namely those giving
triplet RRR, who increase their frequency from about 3.3%, on the average of those who agree
or agree strongly that the governments should reduce income differences, to 8% among those
who neither agree nor disagree, and to around 10% among those who disagree or disagree
strongly.
3. Presentation of the empirical strategy and discussion of the tax satisfaction data
Our aim is to use the data presented in the previous section to study closely the relationships
between the determinants of people’s general preferences for redistribution, on the one side, and
their satisfaction towards the redistributive tax systems, on the other. In the introduction, we
have in particular recalled various theories that link preferences for redistribution to the actual
tax systems via the process of political decision making. In the remainder of the paper, we
develop an empirical strategy that uses the data on the ordered triplets and on the general
preference for redistribution as dependent variables in logistic regressions to test several ideas in
that literature.
We have estimated various models and present below a summary of the main evidence (a
fuller account of the evidence is available from our working paper Bernasconi, 2004). For the
analysis of the tax triplets, we have in particular constructed four dichotomy variables (taking
value 0 or 1). A major variable singles out people who have given triplet RRR, and therefore
identify those who may be considered as dsatisfied with the tax systemsT. Three variables are
then used to classify three different directions of disappointment with the tax systems: the
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we take to comprise triplets RRL, HLL, HRL and HHL; the category of those who see instead
dtoo much redistributionT in the systems, including triplets LLH, LRH, LHH, RRH; and the
category of those who seem to judge dtaxes overall too highT, including triplets HHH, HHR
and RHH.7
A similar dichotomy variable is obtained from the question on general preference for
redistribution. Specifically, following Corneo and Gru¨ner (2002), we have constructed a
variable that takes the value of 1 if respondents bagreeQ or bagree stronglyQ that governments
should reduce income differences, and the value of 0 if they do not agree (any of the answers
bneither agree nor disagreeQ, bdisagreeQ, and bdisagree stronglyQ). We call this variable
PREFRED.
Various logistic regressions are conducted for the dichotomy variables, which focus on the
effects of several micro covariates constructed from the ISSP data set. These in particular
include variables for the income classes of the respondents, their ideological affiliations,
variables for personal or sociological characteristics of the respondents, like gender, age,
marital status, education and occupational status, variables for beliefs in factors of success in
life and in equality of opportunities. We give more information on the various micro
covariates included and on their relationships with the theoretical literature in the next section,
when we present the results of the different models estimated. (See also Appendix A, for a
detailed list of all the covariates used in the analysis, their source, construction and summary
statistics).
The regressions are based on the aggregate sample of countries. This allows us to exploit the
large size of the data set, which is important given the low frequencies of many ordered triplets
(including triplet RRR). Several macro conditions may have obviously affected the answers of
people of different countries. The regressions conducted below will explicitly control for two
macro covariates referring to two important characteristics of the actual tax systems of the
different countries: one is a measure for the overall fiscal pressures given by the total tax
revenues as percentages of GDP in the respondents’ countries at the time of the surveys (variable
dTAXEST in the regressions); the other is an index of the tax progressivity represented by the top
marginal personal income tax rate (dTOP_RATET in the regressions).8
It is important to control for the two tax variables. In particular, when dealing with survey
questions, there are always some difficulties in interpreting the answers. Typical issues are
whether the interviewees fully understand the questions; whether different people treat the same
question similarly; whether the answers can be considered as the expression of individual
opinions or as the effect of convention or, perhaps, propaganda. For example, with reference to
opinion surveys on prospective tax reforms in the U.S., some recent studies (e.g., Bartels, 2004;8 For the OECD countries included in the sample, the source for the variable TAXES is the OECD (Revenue Statistics,
2001); for the three non-OECD countries, namely Bulgaria, Russia and Slovenia, the source is Mitra and Stern (2003).
Data for TOP_RATE are obtained from the Fraser Institute (The Freedom of the World: 2003 Annual Report). (More
details on both variables in Appendix A).
7 Obviously, we acknowledge that there may be some arbitrariness in forming the three categories and that there may be
different ways of aggregating triplets in the various categories. But we note that reasonable differences in the ways of
constructing the three categories donTt affect the results presented below. In fact, we emphasize that the post-regression
accounting presented in this version of the paper in the form of predicted probabilities for the categories of tax triplets
(see Section 4.3 below) is substantially identical to that given in our working paper (Bernasconi, 2004, available at http://
www.unipv.it/websiep/wp/323.pdf), which is based on (multinomial) logit regressions conducted on the whole set of
individual triplets.
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standings and misconceptions in people’s answers.
Thus, given that the main objective of the present analysis is to establish whether the
observed tax systems reflect the citizens’ preferences, it seems specifically important to control
for the connection between actual taxes in the different countries and individuals’ feelings
expressed in the surveys.
Generic dummies for country fixed effects are also included in the analysis to account for
several other macro conditions that might have affected the answers in different countries. These
may for example be due to ethical differences in the attitudes towards inequality at national level,
differences in the quality of the goods provided by the public sector, different constitutional or
electoral rules. In Appendix B, some evidence is also provided across three clusters of countries
more naturally considered together according to the above factors, which shows that the results
found for the aggregate sample are indeed robust across them. (Following previous literature on
the matter, the Appendix in particular distinguishes amongst Anglo-Saxon, European non-post-
communist, and European post-communist countries).
4. Models and results
In this section we report the results of several regressions for the whole sample of countries,
which differ somewhat depending on the micro-covariates included in the various specifications.
We start by detailing the micro covariates of a basic specification, focused on the effects of the
respondents’ income classes, their ideological affiliations and their sociological characteristics.
Then we give the results of the various models estimated, explaining in the process the changes
introduced from the basic specification.9
4.1. The micro-covariates of the basic specification: dummies for income classes, ideological
affiliations, and sociological characteristics
A major variable we obviously focus on is about the respondents’ income classes. In the
simplest theory of the homo oeconomicus, the poor always favour redistribution while the rich
oppose it. In an ideal system of one person-one vote, this implies the classical result that when
voting on redistributive one-dimensional space the median income person is pivotal.
Various critics have however argued that real-world democratic systems are far from ideal and
that the decisive voters are in higher income classes. This may be due to various reasons: a lower
degree of electoral participation among lower-income individuals (see e.g., Edsall, 1984;
Conway, 1985); the fact that wealthier people are less exposed to errors or misconceptions
because of better-informed preferences (e.g., Verba et al., 1978; Wolfinger and Rosenstone,
1980; Bartels, 2004); the effect of interest groups, which through monetary contributions and9 In particular, based on the discussion of the previous section, all regressions estimated have the following genera
form: Prob( Yict = j)=G(b d MICROict+d1 TAXESict+d2 d TOP_RATEict+COUNTRYc). In the model, on the left-hand
side, Yict is one of the five dichotomy dependent variables (namely PREFRED, RRR, and the three other categories of tax
triplets) constructed as specified above from the answers of respondent i, who lives in country c, at the time of survey t
and where, on the right-hand side, G(d ) is the logistic function, MICROict is the vector of the micro covariates obtained
from the ISSP data surveys, TAXESict and TOP_RATEict are the two macro covariates for, respectively, the overall fisca
pressure and the tax progressivity in the respondent’s country at the time of the survey, and COUNTRYc’s are the
dummies for the country fixed effects.l
;
l
M. Bernasconi / European Journal of Political Economy 22 (2006) 809–837820working on campaigns, exert an overall impact on politics, including issues like redistribution
and social expenditure (e.g., Schwabish et al., 2003).10
The simplicity of the redistributive policy space may also be a problem. Breyer and Ursprung
(1998) have for example shown that when the redistributive policy space is multidimensional
(and there are many ways in which income can be transferred from one class to another), an
equilibrium may arise in which the above-average income earners can bribe the segment of
voters with incomes between the median and the mean, in order for them to support policies
limiting the transfers to even lower income classes.
Another equilibrium notion that may arise due to multidimensionality is known as bends
against the middleQ (Epple and Romano, 1996). It applies most notably to cases in which tax
proceeds are used to finance a service for which a private alternative is available. In Epple and
Romano (1996) it is education. Preferences may then not be single-peaked, and a coalition of
middle income households is opposed, and may be beaten in majority voting, by a coalition of
poor and rich households (respectively, below-median and above-mean income earners).11
We study the effects of income classes as follows. From data on the ISSP surveys we
construct five dummies to divide respondents into five income classes: the dpoorT, defined as
respondents with an income strictly lower than the median of the respondents’ country; the
dmedianT, those with an income equal to the median; the dupper medianT, people with incomes
between the median and the mean (strictly greater than the former and strictly lower than the
latter); the dmean and upper meanT, those with an income equal or greater than the mean, but
strictly lower than the threshold for the 95th percentile; and the dtop 5%T, those with incomes
equal or greater than the latter limit. The income distribution used to build the dummies is the per
capita household income obtained, for the various countries in the sample, from the data reported
in the ISSP surveys (details in the Appendix).12 We expect that if the theory of homo
oeconomicus works, PREFRED should increase in income; we also expect that if any of the
above ideas on the role of different income classes on influencing political outcome has any
ability to explain real-world redistributive policies, then people pivotal according to the different
theories should possibly be the most satisfied with the tax systems (in the logit for RRR), or at a
minimum not the least satisfied (in the other triplets).
A vast theoretical literature has emphasized that there are factors shaping people’s attitudes for
redistribution that typically have an ideological dimension, above and beyond any pecuniary12 As in most surveys, some problems arise with the income data included in the present data set. One problem is that
there are several missing values in the variable due to refusal to answer, ignorance, or misunderstandings. Another is that
the definition of income is not uniform across countries, as it may be monthly or yearly income, gross or net. In some
surveys, data is divided into categorical tiers, and it is necessary to use midpoints. Thus, it is acknowledged that the
dummies can only be taken as proxies for the actual income classes. Still, it should be emphasized that the income
indicators constructed on the basis of the information contained in these surveys have been generally proven to be
consistent in producing various expected effects and, for this reason, have been routinely used in many investigations. In
addition, I tested for slightly alternative specifications for the effects of income classes finding consistent effects: a full
report of all the alternative specifications is in Bernasconi (2004), while some details are given in footnote 18.
10 Milder positions on monetary contributions are instead held by those who view them merely as a type of consumption
good (e.g., Ansolabehere et al., 2003), or capable of having at most an influence on policy issues with low social costs (as
in models of special interest politics, e.g., Persson and Tabellini, 2000). Needless to say, on the other hand, that there are
even more radical positions on the effect of money in governing the world, including the modern Marxian theories of the
dcapitalist stateT (Jessop, 1982), still essentially seen as the political field of class contention, with the capitalists holding
all the most powerful weapons.
11 Other situations recently studied that may induce an bends against the middleQ opposition include voting on public
pensions (Casamatta et al., 2000) and redistributive taxation when tax evasion is a possibility (Borck, 2003; Roine, 2003).
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account that redistributive taxation distorts incentives and results in inefficiency (Meltzer and
Richard, 1981). Ethical values and ideals may also be important: for instance, people following
Nozick’s (1974) libertarianism will be naturally averse to redistribution; while those sharing
Rawls’ (1971) concern for the least well-off will be in favour. Obviously, taking into account in a
single model all the non-pecuniary motivations for being in favour of or against redistributive
policies may prove to be too difficult. And the very same notion of a pivotal voter expressed on the
income scale (whether median income or not) may be partial. For this reason, political scientists
have generally tended to supplement the former scale with an ideological one, typically measured
along a left-right dimension (see e.g., Hicks and Swank, 1992, and the literature quoted therein).
In the basic specification, we control for the effect of ideological affiliations as follows. Based
on questions on ideological affiliations, the ISSP surveys classify respondents in 7 categories: 1.
bFar left (communist, etc.)Q, 2. bLeft, centre leftQ, 3. bCentre, liberalQ, 4. bRight, conservativeQ,
5. bFar right, fascist etc.Q, 6. bOther, no specificationQ, 7. bNo party, no preferenceQ. We
reclassify subjects as dleft-wingerT from categories 1 or 2, dright-wingerT from categories 4 or 5,
and dcentristT from categories 3, 6 and 7.13 We test whether general preferences for redistribution
(PREFRED) are stronger moving along the ideological scale from dleft-wingerT to dright-
wingerT; and we test which of three partisan groups is the most satisfied with the current tax
systems (namely in giving triplet RRR), which is less and in which direction.14
Several socio-economic indicators are also included in the vector of the basic micro-
covariates. In addition to standard controls like the respondent’s gender, age, and marital status,
we include covariates in the form of dummies to describe: the employment status of the
respondent (whether employed or unemployed), the level of education attained (in particular a
dummy for those with a university degree), whether the respondent is a member of a trade union,
and whether self-employed.
The purpose of these variables is twofold. On the one hand, in the logit on PREFRED, we
take them as a control to check whether we find similar effects for these variables as those
reported in previous studies on preference for fiscal redistribution (e.g., Ravallion and Lokshin,
2000; Corneo and Gru¨ner, 2002; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). On the other hand, in the
regressions on the tax triplets, we wish to investigate how people identified by the same controls
answer the tax questions.
4.2. Coefficients estimated for the basic specification
Table 5 gives the coefficients estimated for the regressions on PREFRED, on triplet RRR and
on the three other categories of triplets of the basic specification. (The table also recalls the13 The results presented below are not affected if categories 6 and 7 are omitted from the analysis.
14 A problem with such a specification may obviously be that responses could be distorted by the political side of the
government in power at the time of the surveys, which may influence answers only because of sympathy for the curren
governments. In a further model specification, we therefore disregard the effect of partisanship as individual controls, and
interact the dummies of partisanship with the dummy of income classes. The purpose of the exercise is to analyse whethe
by interacting the two variables one can improve the explanatory ability of each individually considered dimension. It is
specifically interesting to control the extent to which the views and the effects on redistribution policies of people in the
various income classes may also depend on their political affiliation; and also to control whether or not people of centris
beliefs, particularly in the median income class, are more strategically important in influencing the redistributive politica
outcome, as also suggested by various arguments developed within the political science tradition (e.g., Hicks and Swank
1992, and the literature quoted therein).t
r
t
l
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Table 5
Logits on PREFRED and categories of ordered triplets
Dependent PREFRED dSatisfied with
the tax systemT
dToo much
redistributionT
dToo little
redistributionT
dTaxes overall
too highT
(Triplets) (RRR) (LLH, LRH,
LHH, RRH)
(RRL, HLL,
HRL, HHL)
(RHH, HHR,
HHH)
(Frequencies in sample) (57.4%) (6.0%) (2.3%) (48.4%) (29.5%)
Unemployed 0.303** 0.152 0.273 0.048 0.024
(0.064) (0.138) (0.227) (0.060) (0.065)
Self-employed 0.284** 0.089 0.253* 0.322** 0.238**
(0.042) (0.078) (0.116) (0.043) (0.044)
Trade union member 0.215** 0.146* 0.257* 0.178** 0.130**
(0.030) (0.059) (0.103) (0.029) (0.032)
Graduate 0.380** 0.293** 0.427** 0.278** 0.011
(0.031) (0.060) (0.088) (0.032) (0.034)
Male 0.184** 0.136** 0.12 0.050* 0.025
(0.024) (0.049) (0.077) (0.024) (0.026)
Married 0.235** 0.094 0.024 0.110** 0.079**
(0.027) (0.054) (0.088) (0.026) (0.029)
Age 0.008** 0.000 0.010** 0.006** 0.006**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Median people 0.292** 0.320** 0.344 0.198** 0.007
(0.068) (0.124) (0.204) (0.068) (0.074)
Upper median 0.332** 0.142 0.141 0.173** 0.111*
(0.042) (0.086) (0.141) (0.042) (0.045)
Mean and upper mean 0.562** 0.163** 0.246** 0.279** 0.164**
(0.028) (0.058) (0.093) (0.028) (0.030)
Top 5% 1.089** 0.517** 0.744** 0.765** 0.428**
(0.052) (0.089) (0.130) (0.052) (0.052)
Left-wing 0.549** 0.133* 0.518** 0.317** 0.306**
(0.031) (0.065) (0.109) (0.030) (0.033)
Right-wing 0.535** 0.320** 0.386** 0.441** 0.277**
(0.031) (0.060) (0.092) (0.032) (0.034)
TAXES 0.986 6.849** 6.966 5.493** 11.396**
(1.191) (2.504) (4.196) (1.170) (1.359)
TOP_RATE 0.155 1.875** 2.029* 1.243** 1.601**
(0.258) (0.493) (0.828) (0.255) (0.277)
Observations 34027 31373 31373 31373 31373
Pseudo R2 0.123 0.037 0.056 0.070 0.061
LR 20295.3 6861.8 3196.1 20203.4 17933.4
Regressions models include country dummies; standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in brackets; one star
denotes significant at 5% level, two stars denote significance at 1% level.
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the impacts of the micro covariates across all regressions; next we comment on the effects of the
two macro covariates, namely TAXES and TOP_RATE.
The impacts of the micro controls on PREFRED confirm most of the findings of previous
studies on the matter. They are also consistent with various intuitions, from economics as well as
from political science and sociology. The evidence is that support for redistribution decreases
monotonically with the income classes. (Note that the regression takes the dpoorT, namely the
people with an income strictly lower than the median, as the reference category). The
coefficients are highly significant. Also, preferences for redistribution decrease along the
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The effects of the sociological dummies are also as generally expected. We note the following:
the unemployed and trade union members are more in favour of redistribution, while the self-
employed and people with higher degrees are less in favour. Various factors may explain the
effects of this group of sociological controls. One is risk aversion: the self-employed and those
who invest more in human capital may be more prone to taking risks, and value less the public
insurance offered by redistributive policies. They may also be those benefiting the least from
these programs. In addition, these people may also be those who view, more than others, social
mobility as a close substitute for redistribution: on the one hand, in the case of the older self-
employed and college graduates, this may be due to experienced mobility; on the other hand, for
the younger self-employed and graduates, it may derive from greater expectations of economic
advancement. The opposing arguments may explain why the unemployed and trade-union
members are instead more in favour of redistribution. Also notice that all the above variables are
highly significant, at the 1% level. The same is true for the dummies for males and for married
people. Both are negative, as reported by previous studies.15 The effect of age is positive, but
quite small. Previous studies found contrasting signs.16
Comparing the above results with the regressions on RRR and on the other categories of triplets
shows a very interesting picture: even if generally less significant (especially the sociological
dummies), the effects of all covariates on RRR are opposite in sign to those found for PREFRED.
Conversely, they are quite in line with the logit for those who see dtoo much redistributionT in the
tax systems (and again opposite to those who see dtoo little redistributionT in the systems, while the
results for those who see dtaxes overall too highT are more mixed). The evidence therefore
corroborates the impression (especially from Table 4) that the satisfaction with the tax systems is
negatively correlated with preferences for redistribution. Notwithstanding, there is an important
feature in the estimates of RRR that is important to emphasize, namely that satisfaction with the
current tax systems is bimodal within the income classes: to see this, notice that the highest
estimated coefficient is for people in the top 5% of the distribution, but the second highest is the
dmedianT; both people with an income between the median and the mean (the dupper medianT), and
those with an income between the mean and the top 5% limit (the dmean and upper meanT), are
more satisfied than the dpoorT, but also significantly less than the previous two income classes.17
The income effects estimated on the three categories of triplets deviating from satisfaction
qualify further the results. In particular, on the one side, the coefficients confirm that the dpoorT
are those protesting the most for dtoo little redistributionT in the tax systems, and the least for dtoo
much redistributionT, while the opposite holds for the richest dtop 5%T; on the other side, the15 The negative effect of being married on the support for redistribution may be surprising at first. A possible
explanation among others refers to greater opportunities of risk-sharing within families (and hence less need of
redistribution policies) for married people.
16 Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) and Corneo and Gru¨ner (2002) report a positive effect of age; while Alesina and La
Ferrara (2005) find a negative sign. Adding a squared term in the present analysis is not significant.
17 As alluded to, we also considered different specifications for the effects of the income classes finding similar
evidence. Among others, in a specification based on income quintiles we have found that the top quintile has the largest
impact on RRR, with the third quintile coming second; in a model based on income deciles, we have found that the 10th
decile is the most supportive of the fiscal systems, followed by the 6th and the 5th deciles. Interestingly, we also
emphasize that in all the above specifications, the evidence on the effects of the central classes in supporting triplet RRR
is weaker than that documented for the dmedianT. (Notice also that using a straight income indicator rather than dummies
for income classes, e.g., the log of the ratio between the household per capita income divided by the average per capita
household income in the respondentTs country, has an overall positive effect.)
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income classes and in particular that the dmedianT come third in the disappointment for dtoo little
redistributionT, are second in that for dtoo much redistributionT (only after the top 5%), and are
those protesting the least for viewing dtaxes overall too highT.
The effects of the ideological affiliations appear more straightforward. In particular, being a
right-winger increases the probability of viewing the tax systems as redistributing too much, of
judging taxes overall too high and also of being satisfied with the tax systems; the opposite
applies to left-wingers. Even if the results do not differentiate between effects due to pure
ideology from others possibly arising from sympathy for the governments in charge in the
various countries at the time of the surveys, the evidence once more adds to the fact that all
factors that are found on the one side to reduce general preference for redistribution tend to work
on the other side in giving more support to the current fiscal systems.
Consider now the effects of the macro-covariates TAXES and TOP_RATE. In the logit on
PREFRED they have been included mainly for comparison with the other regressions. In
particular, as PREFRED traces people’s general preferences for redistribution, we don’t expect
the variable responding to the actual characteristics of the different countries’ tax systems. The
evidence confirms this expectation.
However, the regressions on the tax triplets show that the respondents’ attitudes towards the
observed tax systems do respond to the actual characteristics of the systems; furthermore, the
signs of the two covariates appear in the right directions. To see this, consider firstly the effects
of the two controls on the categories of triplets signalling disappointment with the tax systems:
the evidence is that both the disappointments for viewing dtoo much redistributionT in the
systems and for considering dtaxes overall too highT are stronger in countries where the systems
are indeed more progressive18 and taxes higher; the converse is true for the disappointment for
dtoo little redistributionT, which is lower where the systems are more progressive and taxes
(hence possibly the overall level of public expenditure) higher. The effects on triplet RRR are
slightly more subtle, but also consistent with intuition. On the one side, satisfaction decreases
with higher taxation, which is intuitively consistent with the fact that, other things held constant,
people don’t like paying taxes; on the other side, satisfaction decreases with more progressive
systems. Initially this may appear to contrast the fact that the majority of people are disappointed
because of too little redistribution in the systems. We have, however, discovered that the few
people satisfied with the tax systems, namely giving triplet RRR, are in fact those with weaker
preferences for redistribution. In such respect, it is then not surprising that in countries where
taxes are more progressive, support for triplet RRR is even lower.
4.3. Quantifying the impacts of the micro-covariates on the tax triplets
We find the coefficients estimated from the basic specification very interesting. They show
that several micro-covariates do indeed influence people’s attitude towards the current tax
systems and that the results are robust for a check on people’s perception of the actual
characteristics of the systems. Most intriguing, among other things, is the evidence that median
people are the second most satisfied with the distribution of taxes. On the one hand, this gives
some support to the central idea in the literature on redistributive policies, that median people18 We also try other measures for the progressivity of the tax system as alternative to TOP_RATE, like the difference
between the pre-tax and the post-tax Gini coefficients. The evidence is similar to that presented in Table 5. We give the
results for TOP_RATE because its lower correlation with TAXES (which is only 0.18).
Table 6
Predicted probabilities and marginal effects for categories of triplets
Collections of attitudes towards
tax systems
dSatisfied with
the tax systemT
dToo much
redistributionT
dToo little
redistributionT
dTaxes overall
too highT
(Triplets) (RRR) (LLH, LRH,
LHH, RRH)
(RRL, HLL,
HRL, HHL)
(RHH, HHR,
HHH)
(Frequencies in sample) (6.0%) (2.3%) (48.4%) (29.5%)
Sociological dum. (marg. eff.)
Unemployed 0.7 0.6 0.6 1.1
Self-employed 0.7 0.7 7.2 4.7
Trade union member 0.7 0.4 3.5 2.6
Graduate 1.8 1.0 6.1 0.3
Male 0.7 0.2 1.0 0.4
Married 0.6 0.3 3.7 2.0
Income classes
Poor 5.3 1.9 52.2 27.7
Median 7.2 2.6 47.7 27.6
Upper median 6.1 2.1 48.3 29.7
Mean and upper mean 6.2 2.4 45.6 30.9
Top 5% 8.8 4.0 34.7 36.6
Ideological affiliation
Left-wing 5.0 1.4 55.9 24.2
Centrist 5.7 2.3 48.5 29.8
Right-wing 7.6 3.2 38.7 35.7
Predicted probabilities and marginal effects simulated from coefficients estimated in Table 5.
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especially support the various ideas developed to explain limitation in redistribution with the
hypothesis that pivotal voters would somehow be just above the median, or even the mean.
Likewise, the evidence is also not favourable to models of bends against the middleQ, in which
the median should actually be those most disappointed.
Notwithstanding, the results are obviously very far from the median voter theorem, which
would imply that having controlled for all the other variables, the dmedianT should be decisive.
In fact, more generally, none of the estimated coefficients appear able to exert an overall decisive
support on triplet RRR, not even the dtop 5%T or the dright-wingerT, which remain the controls
exerting the largest positive impacts.
To better quantify the effects of the various micro-covariates for the distribution of the tax
triplets, in Table 6 we give post-regression accounting of their impacts in the form of predicted
probabilities and marginal effects. They have been computed as follows. Begin by considering
the sociological dummies. For each individual in the sample, we have calculated his or her
predicted probabilities of giving any of the various categories of triplets when setting the various
covariates equal to 1 and to 0. The table shows the difference between the average probabilities
so computed.19 The figures substantiate the evidence that sociological variables and personal
characteristics affect people’s attitudes towards redistribution policies. They also indicate which19 As anticipated in footnote 8, the simulations presented are substantially identical to those that would have been
obtained estimating a multinomial logit on the whole set of individual triplets, and then aggregating the simulations
across the triplets of each category.
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6.1% on the triplets of dtoo little redistributionT), self-employed (+0.7% on RRR, 7.2% on
dtoo little redistributionT and +4.7% on dtaxes overall too highT), trade union members (0.7%,
+3.5 and 2.6%, in order, on the same categories of triplets).
For the impact of the income classes, the table reports the sample average predicted
probabilities of giving any of the various tax triplets, making the dummy for each class equal
to 1, while keeping the dummies for the other classes equal to 0 (and the other covariates at
their sample value). The marginal effects of changing the income status from one class to
another can be computed for each triplet as the difference between the predicted probabilities
for two classes. For example, being in the dtop 5%T rather than in the dpoorT increases (on
average) the chances of being satisfied with the tax system (namely of giving triplet RRR) by
+3.5% (8.8–5.3%); while being in the dmedianT rather than in the dmean and upper meanT by
+1.0%. Similar computations regarding to the other income classes confirm that the median
are the second most satisfied with the tax systems (+1.9% and +1.1%, respectively, above the
dpoorT and the dupper medianT, 1.6% below the dtop 5%T) and that the dtop 5%T are
distinctly the first (+2.6% above the adjacent dmean and upper meanT). Even the latter
income class, however, is far from being pivotal.20 The evidence from the other categories of
triplets, specifically the last two categories in the table, may contribute to explain why. The
simulations for them in particular show that, in absolute terms, the largest effect of moving
upwards in the income distribution is to decrease the disappointment for dtoo little redistributionT
in the tax systems, namely from 52.2% amongst the dpoorT to 34.7% among the dtop 5%T, and to
increase that for dtaxes overall too highT, from 27.7% to 36.6% between the two classes in the
same order.
The predicted probabilities for the ideological affiliations show a somewhat similar
picture.21 In particular, the simulations for rightists, the most satisfied with the tax systems, give
a predicted probability for triplet RRR of 7.6%; the marginal effect above leftists is +2.6%; it is
+2.0% above centrists. The effects are not negligible (as for example compared with the
impacts of the sociological dummies, or considered relatively to the sample frequency of the
triplet, i.e., only 6%), though they cannot clearly be viewed as pivotal for the current tax
systems. Larger impacts apply to the other categories of triplets: rightists are in particular also
the least disappointed for dtoo little redistributionT in the tax systems, with 38.7% as predicted
probability, and 10.2% and 17.2% as marginal effects below centrists and leftists,
respectively; while they are the most unhappy for dtaxes overall all too highT, with 35.7% as
predicted probability, and +5.9% and +11.5% as marginal effects above, respectively,
centrists and leftists. (For triplets of dtoo much redistributionT, the order is the same, but the
effects are smaller).
4.4. The effect of equality of opportunities
In this sub-section, we control for a further factor that may affect redistributive outcomes. As
alluded to in the introduction, there is in particular an increasing emphasis in the literature on
political redistribution on the impact that beliefs in equality of opportunity may have in20 In particular, notice that a pivotal class would technically imply, after controlling for all the other factors, a predicted
probability of 1.
21 The predicted probabilities reported in the table have been computed as for the income classes, setting in turn each
dummy for leftists, centrists and rightists equal 1, holding the other two dummies equal 0.
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e.g., Piketty, 1995; Be´nabou and Ok, 2001). In such a respect, the survey evidence analysed in
various recent studies (including those by Fong, 2001; Corneo and Gru¨ner, 2002; Alesina and La
Ferrara, 2005), while confirming that people believing that markets give fair chances to
everybody and that social background is unimportant have weaker preferences for redistribution
from a general perspective, is silent about the extent to which concern for equality of opportunity
may actually explain real-world redistribution policies.
The ISSP provides some useful data in addressing the latter issue, but only with reference to
the 1987 and 1992 surveys. Both surveys contain in particular a group of questions asking
respondents to value bhow important are various factors to getting ahead in lifeQ. Among factors
considered are hard work, a wealthy family, having political connections. Answers can range
from 1 (essential) to 5 (not important at all). Dummies for the above factors have been
constructed, taking value d1T for answers of type 1 or 2 or 3, and d0T for answers of type 4 or 5.
We have also considered a dummy for people who have experienced upwards social mobility.
The dummy is based on a question asking respondents to compare their present income with
their father’s income at the same age of the respondent. Answers can range from 1. bmuch better
off than father Q, to 2. bbetter off Q, 3. babout equal Q, 4. bworse off Q, and 5. bmuch worse off Q.
The question is only available in the 1992 survey. The dummy used in the regression is d1T for
answers of type 1 or 2, and d0T for answers of type 3, 4 or 5.
Table 7 reports the coefficients for the above dummies estimated in models where the
covariates have been added one at a time to the basic specification of Table 5. Begin by
considering the logit for PREFRED. The results confirm the evidence from the various recent
studies that preferences for redistribution are influenced by the perception of the fairness of the
social game, as the various dummies enter in the regressions with high statistical significance
and with expected signs: in particular weakening preferences for redistribution in the case of
dbelief in hard workT and dexperienced mobilityT, while making preferences for redistributionTable 7
Estimated coefficients for beliefs in equality of opportunity
Dependent PREFRED dSatisfied with
the tax systemT
dToo much
redistributionT
dToo little
redistributionT
dTaxes overal
too highT
(Triplets) (RRR) (LLH, LRH,
LHH, RRH)
(RRL, HLL,
HRL, HHL)
(RHH, HHR,
HHH)
(Frequencies in sample) (58.9%) (6.0%) (2.0%) (48.7%) (28.7%)
Belief in:
— hard-work 0.291** 0.259 0.259 0.151 0.041
(0.089) (0.183) (0.271) (0.082) (0.091)
— wealthy family 0.175** 0.114 0.016 0.046 0.041
(0.036) (0.070) (0.121) (0.035) (0.038)
— political connections 0.221** 0.190* 0.199 0.078* 0.016
(0.039) (0.076) (0.131) (0.037) (0.040)
Experienced mobility 0.181** 0.174 0.050 0.201** 0.124
(0.061) (0.126) (0.236) (0.058) (0.064)
Effects estimated in individual models including also the same controls as the basic model of Table 5. The questions to
study beliefs in hard-work, wealthy family, political collections are included only in the surveys conducted in 1987 and
1992; the two samples together include about 15,100 observations (with marginal differences across regressions). The
question to study experienced mobility is included only in the 1992 surveys, with about 7100 observations available fo
the regression. Standard errors and legend for statistical significance as in Table 5 (sample frequencies at the top of the
table are from the aggregate 1992–1987 surveys).l
r
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factors dto get ahead in lifeT.
Consider now the regressions for the tax triplets. One interesting piece of evidence is that the
impacts of these covariates on the occurrence of triplet RRR are once again in all cases opposite
to the signs discovered for PREFERD. The estimated coefficients however appear small and
only in one case (namely, dbelief in political connectionsT) reaching statistical significance at a
conventional level (5%). The evidence on the other categories of triplets is confirmed to be
generally weak.22
Overall, the above results support the view that equality of opportunity is a concern
influencing both people’s preference for redistribution, and also the way in which they judge
actual redistributive outcomes; on the other hand, however, such factors appear more marginal
than income classes and ideology23 and are certainly not able to explain observed limits in
redistribution policies as resulting from the will of the majority.
4.5. Interacting the dummies for income classes with the dummies for ideological affiliations
Perhaps, one may view the evidence that no single variable is able to play a decisive effect in
supporting the current tax systems just as a natural confirmation of the difficulty of designing a
fiscal system that satisfies the majority of the individuals. Conversely, however, one may also
view in it a confirmation that the very same idea of a pivotal voter is unsatisfactory, and that
many dimensions interact to determine people’s attitudes towards redistributive taxation. From
this perspective, an interesting final exercise is to verify how the two major dimensions that we
have found affect people’s answers, namely pecuniary self-interest and ideology, are related in
influencing the results.
To obtain evidence on the issue, we estimated a model interacting the dummies for the
income classes with those for ideological affiliations. Table 8 reports the predicted probabilities
of income classes across ideological affiliations obtained as post-regression accounting from the
exercise.24 The results are interesting. Some are in line with previously reported evidence.
Others represent further qualifications.
Considering the simulations for triplet RRR, we see once more that the right-wingers are on
average the most satisfied with the tax systems, followed by centrists, and by left-wingers. More
importantly, the same order, rightists-centrist-leftists, basically holds across each individual
income class (with the possible exception of the dmean and upper mean—leftistsT, a little more
satisfied than the corresponding centrist income class). In addition, within each ideological
category, the dpoorT remain the least satisfied, while the dtop 5%T are the most supportive of the
fiscal systems.
One new qualification, however, is that while the dtop 5%—rightistsT and dtop 5%—centristsT
give the highest predicted probabilities, the simulation for the dtop 5%—leftistsT is beaten by
almost all the income classes of the rightist (with the exception of the dpoorT), and is just equal to
the dmedian–centristT. A second qualification is that while satisfaction is bimodal with the22 We have also estimated specifications without the covariates for political ideologies or sociological controls: the
magnitude of the estimates is not substantially affected compared to those reported in the table.
23 The latter point is also confirmed by simulations of predicted probabilities obtained from the above regressions,
which are not reported for brevity and are available in Bernasconi (2004).
24 The estimated regressions, conducted on the whole sample, include also the controls for the sociological variables and
dummies for country-fixed effects. (They are not included for brevity; they are available upon request.)
Table 8
Predicted probabilities of income classes across ideological affiliations
Collections of attitudes towards
tax systems
dSatisfied with
the tax systemT
dToo much
redistributionT
dToo little
redistributionT
dTaxes overal
too highT
(Triplets) (RRR) (LLH, LRH,
LHH, RRH)
(RRL, HLL,
HRL, HHL)
(RHH, HHR,
HHH)
(Frequencies in sample) (6.0%) (2.3%) (48.4%) (29.5%)
Left-wing
Poor 4.2 1.4 58.7 23.4
Median 6.2 1.0 54.4 22.8
Upper median 4.8 1.2 56.9 23.9
Mean and upper mean 5.5 1.3 54.0 25.1
Top 5% 7.5 2.3 46.4 25.2
Centrist
Poor 5.2 1.8 52.7 27.9
Median 7.5 3.5 48.3 27.0
Upper median 5.5 2.0 46.8 30.3
Mean and upper mean 5.4 2.6 45.9 31.2
Top 5% 8.9 3.5 34.7 38.8
Right-wing
Poor 6.8 2.4 43.8 32.7
Median 7.9 3.0 39.2 34.2
Upper median 8.4 3.4 39.5 36.0
Mean and upper mean 8.0 3.5 34.8 37.8
Top 5% 10.2 6.5 21.9 45.1
Predicted probabilities obtained from logit regressions estimated interacting the dummies for the income classes with
those of partisanship. (The estimated model includes also the controls for the sociological variables and dummies fo
fixed effects as in the basic model of Table 5.)
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rincome classes across all ideological groups, the dmedianT are distinctly second among both
dleftistsT and dcentristsT, while they are fourth among drightistsT. It is interesting also to notice
that, with regards to triplet RRR, the marginal effects across the income classes are in absolute
value similar amongst all ideological categories: for example, the largest marginal effects
between income classes (which, for all ideological categories, are between the dpoorT and the
dtop 5%T), are +3.3% (7.5–4.2%) amongst leftists, +3.7% (8.9–5.2%) amongst centrists, and
+3.4% (10.8–6.8%) among rightists.
On the other triplets there seems instead to be a different degree of homogeneity in the
opinions of people of the same ideology, but different income classes. Leftists seem in particular
more homogeneous than both centrists and rightists. For example, looking at the simulations for
dtoo little redistributionT, the marginal effects between the probability predicted for the dpoorT
and the dtop 5%T are: 12.3% among leftists, 18% among centrists and 21.9% among
rightists. For dtaxes overall too highT, the similarity amongst leftists seems even stronger, as the
difference between the predicted probabilities for the same two income classes is only 1.8%,
while it is 10.9% among centrists and 12.4% amongst rightists. The analysis of the same figures
also confirms that leftists of all income classes are more disappointed than, in order, both
centrists and rightists in viewing the tax systems as not redistributing enough, while they are less
disappointed for judging dtaxes overall too highT (and, obviously, also for seeing dtoo much
redistributionT in the systems).
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is really a multidimensional issue, with a strong ideological component across all income
classes.
5. Concluding view
The data presented in the above analysis are clearly complex and may not please those in
search of simple answers to questions such as whether people in a democracy are satisfied with
the redistributive tax systems they face; whether they consider the tax systems progressive
enough; and whether they view the general level of taxation as too high or about right. These
are important questions, not only when assessing the effectiveness of the fiscal policies of states
but also the functioning of democratic systems more generally. The answers, however, do not
appear to be simple.
To obtain some evidence, this paper has considered directly what people say about the
redistributive tax systems in their countries. Economic literature has generally been more
reluctant than other social sciences to use surveys in order to test theoretical ideas and
hypotheses. Still, change is taking place in the increasing attention to analysing people’s
opinions and their justifications for their attitudes towards redistribution. We obviously agree
with this new perspective, and we specifically believe that, even if it were excessive to interpret
views on redistributive policies as direct expressions of political will, it would be wrong and
presumptuous to simply ignore what people say, under the assumption that, in a democracy, the
will of the people ultimately always prevails.
In fact, we are of two minds regarding the evidence we have found. On the one hand, the data
clearly documents the existence of a relevant disappointment among people in democratic
countries with the way the tax burden is distributed across income classes. Most people, in several
countries the absolute majority, think that taxes on low and middle incomes are too high, while
taxes on high incomes are too low. In addition, we have found a systematic tendency, for all
factors inducing stronger preferences for redistribution policies from a general perspective, to
work in the direction of decreasing satisfaction with the current tax systems. Most notably, we
have found that people in the top income classes are unambiguously the most supportive of the
current tax systems.
On the other hand, we did not find clear evidence that any income class has a pivotal effect. In
fact, we have found that satisfaction with the tax system is bimodal, and in particular that the
medians are the second strongest supporters of the current redistributive tax systems. This is not
a trivial point. Among other things, this is evidence against many of the theoretical models that
take as a general hypothesis of explaining limits in redistribution that the decisive voter is
somehow just above the median, or even the mean, income.
Overall, the results reported in this paper are more supportive of approaches emphasizing that
preferences for redistribution have a multidimensional nature, as often noted by the political
science literature. Most notably, in the present investigation, the ideological affiliation remains a
major element of confrontation on redistributive taxation, holding across all income classes—
with leftists especially disappointed with the current tax systems viewed as not sufficiently
redistributive (but who seem overall less unsatisfied with the general level of taxation), and
rightists who instead want less taxation for all.
In a similar perspective, the evidence on the several other dimensions has been found to
influence people’s opinions on real world redistributive tax systems, including impacts of values
and beliefs associated with equality of opportunities that, while having been confirmed to affect
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providing the final explanation for observed limits in real world redistributive policies.
The problem of multidimensionality clearly makes it difficult to establish the extent to which
democracy can be viewed as working satisfactorily through the redistributive preferences of the
majority of citizens. The answer may well depend on individual sensitivities. We have tried to be
as fair as possible in presenting and commenting the evidence. A final view is that the general
context differs from an ideal in which all preferences count equally, although it seems that there is
indeed more than suggested by a first inspection of the answers to the tax satisfaction questions. In
any case, the data have been provided and everybody can make up his or her own mind.
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Appendix A. Description of data
The survey data used in this study comes from the International Social Survey Programme
(ISSP), which since 1985 has conducted social surveys in the countries participating in the
programme on relevant topics in the social sciences. The data considered in this paper is from
three modules: the Social Inequality Modules I and II, conducted respectively in 1987 and 1992,
and the Role of Government Module III in 1996. The whole ISSP data archive is maintained at
Zentralarchiv fu¨r Empirische Sozialforschung at the University of Cologne, Germany: http://
www.gesis.org/ZA/. Below we report the basic sources and statistics of the variables used in the
regressions (further details can be found in Bernasconi, 2004).
A.1. Construction of variables
Dependent variables:
Dummy for dSatisfied with the tax systemsT is 1 if tax triplet of Table 2 is (RRR); 0 otherwise.
Dummy for dToo much redistributionT is 1 if tax triplet is any of (LLH, LRH, LHH, RRH); 0
otherwise.
Dummy for dToo little redistributionT is 1 if tax triplet is any of (RRL, HLL, HRL, HHL); 0
otherwise.
Dummy for dTaxes overall too highT is 1 if tax triplet is any of (RHH, HHR, HHH); 0
otherwise.
Dummy PREFRED: based on question bIt is the responsibility of the government to reduce
the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomesQ.
PREFRED is 1, if respondent answers bagree stronglyQ or bagreeQ; it is 0 if respondent answers
bneither agree nor disagreeQ, bdisagreeQ, bdisagree stronglyQ.
Covariates
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1987, 1992, 1996 surveys).
dAge/Age squaredT: respondents’ age and age squared (variables v82, v100, v201 in,
respectively, the 1987, 1992, 1996 surveys).
dMarriedT: 1 if respondent is married, 0 if respondent is not married (from variables on marital
status v85, v101, v202 in, respectively, the 1987, 1992, 1996 surveys).
dGraduateT: 1 if respondent holds a university degree, 0 if respondent doesn’t. Categorization is from
variables on education categories (variables v88, v103, v205 in the three surveys, 1987, 1992, 1996).
dUnemployedT: 1 if respondent is unemployed, 0 if respondent is not unemployed. (From variables
on current employment status v74, v104, v206 in, respectively, the 1987, 1992, 1996 surveys).
dSelf-employedT: 1 if respondent is self-employed, 0 if respondent is not self-employed. (From
variables on self-employment status v72, v110, v213 in, respectively, the 1987, 1992, 1996 surveys).
dTrade union memberT: 1 if respondent is a trade union member, 0 if respondent is not a Trade
Union member. (From variables on trade union membership v81, v112, v213 in, respectively, the
1987, 1992, 1996 surveys.)
dRight-wingT/TLeft-wingT: The ISSP surveys provide country-specific party affiliation
questions. From these questions, ISSP classifies respondents in 7 categories (v96 in the 1987
survey, v121 in the 1992 survey, v223 in the 1996 survey;): 1. bFar left (communist, etc.)Q, 2.
bLeft, centre leftQ, 3. bCentre, liberalQ, 4. bRight, conservativeQ, 5. bFar right, fascist etc.Q, 6.
bOther, no specificationQ, 7. bNo party, no preferenceQ. In the regressions, dleft-wingT is d1T from
categories 1 or 2, d0T otherwise; and dright-wingT is d1T from categories 4 or 5, and d0T otherwise.
dCentristsT is d1T if both dleft-wingT and dright-wingT are d0T, and it is d0T otherwise. (For Italy,
1996, the same distinction is based on variable v259 on voting in last election.)
Dummies for income classes: They have been constructed from the distribution of the per
capita household income obtained, for the various countries in the sample from the data reported
in the ISSP surveys. The per capita household income yi has been computed as the ratio between
the variables dHousehold incomeT and dHousehold sizeT both reported in the surveys. In detail:
dHousehold incomeT: Data are obtained as follows. Survey 1987: variable v92 for
Netherlands, and v93 (midpoint categories) for Australia, Great Britain, US, West Germany,
Austria; survey 1992: variable v115 for Australia, US, Czechoslovakia, Slovenia, and v116
(midpoint categories) for Germany (East and West), Great Britain, Norway, Austria; survey
1996: variable v218 for all countries.
dHousehold sizeT: variable v92, v119, v273 in, respectively, the 1987, 1992, 1996 surveys.
dBeliefs in hard work, wealthy family, political connectionsT: based on questions (in the order,
v9, v4, v11, in both the 1987 and 1992 surveys), about opportunities for getting ahead in life.
Dummies coded as 1, if respondent answers, for the different factors, bessentialQ, bvery importantQ
or bfairly importantQ; coded as is 0 if answers bnot very importantQ or bnot important at all Q.
dExperienced mobilityT: based on question (v75, only in the 1992 survey) asking bCompared
with your father when he was about your age, are you better off or worse off in your income and
standard of living generally?Q. Dummy coded as 1, if respondent answers bmuch better offQ or
bbetter off Q; coded as 0 if answers babout equal Q, bworse off Q, bmuch worse off Q.
dTAXEST: total tax revenue as proportion of GDP in the respondent’s country. For the OECD
countries, the variable is calculated as three years moving average over the year of the survey
and the two years before (source: Revenue Statistics 1965–2000, OECD, 2001); for the three
non-OECD countries, namely Bulgaria, Russia and Slovenia, the variable is tax revenue in
percent of GDP obtained from P. Mitra and N. Stern (2003), bTax systems in transitionQ, World
bank Policy Research Working Paper 2947.
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survey. Source: Gwartney et al., 2003. Data retrieved from http://www.freetheworld.com.
dCOUNTRYT: dummies for countries fixed effects.
Basic statistics of the dataVariable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
PREFRED 44878 0.58850 0.4921 0 1
dSatisfied with the tax systemsT (RRR) 40949 0.058854 0.235354 0 1
dToo much redistributionT 40949 0.023224 0.150616 0 1
dToo little redistributionT 40949 0.486239 0.499817 0 1
dTaxes overall too highT 40949 0.294733 0.455928 0 1
Unemployed 47222 0.0465 0.2105 0 1
Self employed 47222 0.0892 0.2851 0 1
Trade union member 47222 0.2373 0.4254 0 1
Male 47172 0.4795 0.4996 0 1
Age 46972 45.0221 16.6300 16 97
Graduate 47188 0.1912 0.3933 0 1
Married 47010 0.6304 0.4827 0 1
Left-wing 41740 0.3244 0.4682 0 1
Centrists 41740 0.4041 0.4907 0 1
Right-wing 41740 0.2715 0.4447 0 1
Poor 39749 0.4861 0.4998 0 1
Median 39749 0.0336 0.1803 0 1
Upper median 39749 0.0995 0.2994 0 1
Mean and upper mean 39749 0.3153 0.4646 0 1
Top 5% 39749 0.0654 0.2472 0 1
Beliefs in hard work 21452 0.9417 0.2343 0 1
Beliefs in wealth family 21172 0.5063 0.5000 0 1
Beliefs in political connections 20722 0.4144 0.4926 0 1
Experienced mobility 10227 0.7031 0.4569 0 1
TAXES 47222 0.36182 0.056166 0.258 0.495
TOP_RATE 47222 0.505309 0.096462 0.3 0.72
Australia 47222 0.0819 0.2742 0 1
Austria 47222 0.0423 0.2013 0 1
Bulgaria 47222 0.0214 0.1448 0 1
Canada 47222 0.025 0.1562 0 1
Check Republic 47222 0.0466 0.2108 0 1
East Germany 47222 0.0467 0.2109 0 1
France 47222 0.0278 0.1644 0 1
Great Britain 47222 0.0692 0.2538 0 1
Hungary 47222 0.0318 0.1754 0 1
Ireland 47222 0.021 0.1436 0 1
Italy 47222 0.0234 0.1511 0 1
Japan 47222 0.0264 0.1605 0 1
Netherlands 47222 0.0347 0.183 0 1
New Zealand 47222 0.0254 0.1572 0 1
Norway 47222 0.061 0.2394 0 1
Poland 47222 0.0251 0.1563 0 1
Russia 47222 0.0358 0.1858 0 1
Slovenia 47222 0.0435 0.2039 0 1
Sweden 47222 0.0262 0.1598 0 1
Switzerland 47222 0.0742 0.2621 0 1
United States of America 47222 0.0824 0.2749 0 1
West Germany 47222 0.1282 0.3343 0 1
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The evidence presented in the paper is based on the aggregate sample of countries. It
uses dummies for fixed effects (in addition to the two tax macro-covariates) in order to
account for the several macro conditions that might have affected the overall average
frequencies of the answers in different countries. The fixed effects, however, don’t permit
accounting for the way in which different macro conditions may have also affected
differently the impact of the micro covariates. Thus, even if the theories of political
redistribution tested have been elaborated to hold generally true, it is important to obtain
some evidence about how the results found for the aggregate may hold across different
countries.
To this end, in this Appendix we report results of the estimation of the
basic specification of the text (see Section 4.2) estimated for 3 clusters of countries that
may be more naturally considered together. We have in particular distinguished the following
macro-regions: the Anglo-Saxon countries (including Australia, Great Britain, the U.S., Canada,
New Zealand and Ireland), the Continental European non-post-communist (comprising Austria,
France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) and
the European post-communist countries (namely Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, East Germany,
Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Slovenia).25 The three macro regions may be considered as similar
in various respects. For example Anglo-Saxons in general, and Americans in particular,
have been shown by several surveys to be less concerned about inequality than people
from other nations (see Glazer, 2002 for discussion and references); conversely, individuals
living in the former Socialist countries have been shown to be more concerned (Corneo
and Gru¨ner, 2002). In addition, the distinction between Anglo-Saxon and non-Anglo-Saxon
countries differentiates almost perfectly in the sample between countries with majority rather
than proportional electoral systems (the exceptions being Ireland, a country in the Anglo-Saxon
grouping with a proportional system, and France, with a majority system but part of
the European group, with Germany and Italy having mixed systems). The point may
be important, especially in view of a growing confidence among economists that majority
systems are somehow more generally effective for economic policy than proportional systems
(Persson et al., 2004).
The results of the estimations are reported in Table B.1 in the form of predicted
probabilities and marginal effects of the usual categories of tax triplets. This helps the
comparison across the three macro-regions. At the top of the table we also report the
sample probabilities of the tax triplets in the three regions. The overall distributions are
verified to be similar across the three macro-regions. Still, it is also confirmed that in the
Anglo-Saxon countries there is a lower tendency than in the European countries (both non-
post-communist and post-communist) to be disappointed for dtoo little redistribution in the
systemsT, while to be more disappointed for dtaxes overall all too highT. The frequency of
those satisfied with the systems is higher in the Anglo-Saxon countries (7.0%), followed by
the European non-post-communist (6.0%) and lastly by the European post-communist
(4.4%).25 There clearly are other possible ways of constructing clusters of countries (for example, Great Britain and Ireland
could be included amongst the European non-post-communist; Japan is excluded, but it may perhaps be aggregated to the
European; etc.); but we emphasize that the results presented below are resistant to slight modifications along the lines of
the above general categorizations.
Table B.1: Predicted probabilities and marginal effects from regressions of the basic specification across macro regions
Macro regions Anglo-Saxon Continental Europe (no post-communist) European post-communist
Collections of attitudes
towards tax systems
Satisfied with
the tax sys.
Too much
redistribution
Too little
redistribution
Taxes overall
too high
Satisfied with
the tax sys.
Too much
redistribution
Too little
redistribution
Taxes overall
too high
Satisfied with
the tax sys.
Too much
redistribution
Too little
redistribution
Taxes overall
too high
(Triplets) (RRR) (LLH, LRH,
LHH,RRH)
(RRL, HLL,
HRL, HHL)
(RHH, HHR,
HHH)
(RRR) (LLH, LRH,
LHH, RRH)
(RRL, HLL,
HRL, HHL)
(RHH, HHR,
HHH)
(RRR) (LLH, LRH,
LHH, RRH)
(RRL, HLL,
HRL, HHL)
(RHH, HHR,
HHH)
(Frequencies in sample) (7.0%) (2.1%) (38.9%) (34.5%) (6.0%) (2.3%) (53.2%) (26.5%) (4.4%) (2.0%) (53.9%) (28.0%)
Socio. Dum. (marg. eff.)
Unemployed 0.2 1.1 1.8 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.2 0.6 0.9 0.0 1.4 3.0
Self-employed 1.0 0.3 5.9 4.9 0.5 1.3 7.3 3.5 0.1 0.6 8.3 6.2
Trade Union member 0.9 0.2 4.2 3.2 0.2 0.7 4.6 4.6 1.5 0.2 0.1 1.7
Graduate 0.1 0.1 0.9 3.1 3.8 2.3 11.0 1.0 1.6 0.0 7.0 4.9
Male 0.3 0.2 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.2 1.6 0.4 1.4 0.2 0.5 1.8
Married 0.5 0.5 3.0 0.4 0.7 0.5 6.0 3.5 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.8
Income classes
Poor 6.4 2.0 41.4 33.7 5.3 1.5 58.5 23.8 3.5 1.9 57.5 26.0
Median 8.4 1.6 40.4 30.2 6.6 3.6 51.8 25.9 5.1 1.6 48.8 33.7
Upper median 6.7 2.0 42.5 33.3 6.2 2.5 50.9 28.4 5.2 1.5 51.6 27.1
Mean and upper mean 7.4 2.3 36.0 35.2 6.1 2.5 49.9 28.3 4.7 2.2 51.7 29.9
Top 5% 9.0 3.3 28.9 40.9 9.5 5.3 34.4 35.8 6.7 2.1 44.9 31.9
Ideological affiliation
Left-wing 5.1 1.5 46.2 29.9 5.4 0.9 62.3 20.0 4.1 1.9 56.9 25.3
Centrist 6.3 2.0 41.4 33.8 6.0 2.5 51.5 27.1 4.0 2.0 55.3 28.3
Right-wing 9.6 2.8 28.8 40.2 6.9 3.8 42.2 35.3 5.3 2.3 47.8 30.5
Predicted probabilities and marginal effects simulated from logit regressions of the basic model (Table 5 text) across macro regions. (Regressions for each of the various macro regions include also dummies for fixed effects of the countries
within the regions.)
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M. Bernasconi / European Journal of Political Economy 22 (2006) 809–837836When beginning to consider the simulations, we notice that at the general level the
evidence is indeed quite similar across the three macro-regions. Starting to look at
the effects of the sociological dummies, we first of all see that the signs of the covariates
are comparable between the Anglo-Saxon and the European non-post-communist countries
(out of 24 effects estimated across the triplets—6 dummies4 dependent variables—we
can in particular count only 4 covariates with different signs); the signs are a bit less
comparable with the European post-communist (9 differences from both the Anglo-Saxon
and the European non-post-communist), with the effects however also generally smaller.
The effects of the income classes are also similar. In particular, one of the major points of the
evidence is that the dtop 5%T are the most satisfied (namely giving triplet RRR) with the fiscal
systems of the various countries in all macro-regions, while the dpoorT are the least. In addition,
it is also confirmed for all macro regions that satisfaction is bimodal with income, with the
dmedianT being specifically the second satisfied in both the Anglo-Saxon and in the European
non-post-communist countries, and coming third in the post-communist. There are differences,
notwithstanding, amongst the magnitudes of the effects: the greater satisfaction across all
classes is clearly in the Anglo-Saxon countries, the lower in the European post-communists; the
greatest variation across income classes is in the European non-post-communist. The effect of
dmedianT is distinctly stronger in the Anglo-Saxon countries—a marginal effect of only 0.6%
below the dtop 5%T—perhaps also a sign of a greater efficiency of the majority electoral
systems adopted in such countries. On the other categories of triplets, the effects of income
classes are also comparable in the signs across the macro regions. Perhaps a noticeable
difference is once again for the dmedianT who in both the Anglo-Saxon and in the European
post-communist countries seem to protest distinctly less than the adjacent classes for dtoo little
redistributionT; but while in the Anglo-Saxon countries the lower disappointment turns into (as
noted) more satisfaction, in the post-communist it tends toward more protest for dtaxes overall
too highT.
In all macro regions, the rightists are the more satisfied with the tax systems. The
evidence is stronger in the Anglo-Saxon. On the other categories of triplets the evidence is
as expected and consistent across all macro regions.
Overall, the evidence from this Appendix corroborates with some interesting qualifica-
tions the results reported in the main text for the aggregate sample of counties.
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